~hp-5
What conditions would imply the absence of Pareto improvements available from contracts capable of inducing a rise in effort?
What influence do banks have in the German system?
What happens when a managerial firm enters the market?
What was the ownership interest of corporate directors and management in the years 1973-82?
What is the role of the capital market in preventing cheating of shareholders?
What resources might seek some form of control over the firm?
Why might shareholder monitoring appear to be of little practical importance?
What is the relationship between ownership concentration and firm size?
What is the penalty for 'shirking' in a dispersed corporation?
What does Haubrich (1994) find about 'optimal' contracts?
What are the objections to restrictions on insider dealing?
What is the analogy used to explain the CEO's role in a firm?
What is Clark's viewpoint on the use of the term 'contract' in connection with 'implicit contracts'?
What is the relationship between 'environmental tightness' and monitoring 'pressure'?
What is the focus of corporate governance for Wu?
